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Abstract
This paper studies the efficient pricing of large-value payment systems in the presence
of unobservable heterogeneity across banks. It is shown that the optimal pricing scheme
for a public monopoly system involves quantity discounts in the form of a decreasing
marginal fee. This is also true when the public system competes with a private system
characterized by a lower marginal cost. However in this case, optimal marginal fees in
the public system are lower than its marginal cost, and fixed fees have to be levied. We
also study the case of competition between several public systems. The structure of the
optimal tariff depends on the willingness of Central Banks to allow by-pass.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the efficient pricing of large-value payment systems. These systems,
which are used by banks and large financial service providers to channel payments to each
other, have changed substantially over the last decade. In particular, the volumes trans-
ferred in these systems have increased dramatically, mainly because of growing financial
integration, new financial products and technological developments. This trend raised
concerns among regulators because of its potential implications for systemic stability, and
led to a number of regulatory initiatives with the aim to reduce risk-exposures between
participants (see Bank for International Settlements 1990). These included the promotion
of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems, which replaced netting systems in many
countries.
In Europe, the advent of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) played an equally
important role for the development of large value payment systems. Before EMU, one
or several payment systems existed in each country, all organized differently. Most cross-
border transactions were done via correspondent banks. In order to facilitate the im-
plementation of the single monetary policy in Europe, it was decided in 1995 to build
a European wide payment system, TARGET4, connecting national RTGS systems of all
EMU member states.5 These national components of TARGET were harmonized only to
some degree, e.g. in terms of operating hours. Because monetary policy transactions of
the European Central Bank are conducted using TARGET, all banks wishing to obtain
liquidity from the Central Bank are required to have an account in TARGET.
Naturally, TARGET does not provide the only way to make large value interbank
payments in Europe. Bilateral agreements between banks and correspondent banking
arrangements continue to exist. Furthermore, a few, privately run, netting and hybrid
systems are in place, mostly operating at domestic levels. The biggest of these systems is
Euro1, a net system that offers mainly cross-border payment services. Euro1 is run by the
Euro Banking Association (EBA). In order to use Euro1, a bank must be member of the
EBA and fulfil certain requirements such as good credit rating and a minimum balance
sheet size.
The aim of this paper is to characterize the efficient pricing structure for a public
payment system, depending on the type of competition it faces.This question is relevant
4This is an acronym for Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer.
5see ECB (2001).
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not only for the European case discussed above, but equally well for the US, where a
public RTGS system, Fedwire, exists side by side with CHIPS, a private system6. So
far, the literature on payment systems was mostly concerned with issues of systemic risk.
For instance, Freixas and Parigi (1996) and also Kahn and Roberds (1998) analyze the
trade-off between a more efficient liquidity management in RTGS systems versus higher
systemic risk in netting systems. Few papers have addressed the co-existence of private
and public systems. Exceptions are Rochet and Tirole (1996), who argue in favor of a
close cooperation in the controlling of risk-exposures in both systems, and Holthausen
and Rønde (2001) who analyze access regulation to netting systems.
To our knowledge, there exists no theoretical study so far on the pricing of large value
payment services. There are, however, a few empirical studies on the pricing of Fedwire
(the US equivalent to TARGET). Hancock et al (1999) analyze the pricing on interbank
transactions by testing for scale economies in payments processing. McAndrews (1998) es-
timates demand elasticities for Fedwire payment services. The modelling approach taken
in this paper is closely connected to the literature on natural monopolies and Ramsey pric-
ing (see e.g. Bo¨s 1994). It is also related to issues of competition in telecommunications
and other network industries (see e.g. Laffont and Tirole 2000).
In Section 2 of this paper, we develop a simple model of a banking industry where
banks make payments through a large value payment system. Section 3 analyzes the
benchmark case of a public monopoly payment system. The optimal pricing scheme is
the one that maximizes aggregate surplus of the banking industry under the constraint
that the public payment system breaks even. In section 4, the more interesting case of a
mixed duopoly is studied, in which banks are free to choose whether to route the payments
through a public or a private payment system.
As noted above, national RTGS systems in the EMU are not fully harmonized. In
particular, the fee structure for domestic payments differs across systems. This leads to
a situation where these systems compete for payments, because larger banks that are
incorporated in several countries may be able to choose which national system to use to
route payments.7 To capture such an environment, in Section 5 of this paper we study
the optimal pricing when two public systems compete for customers.
6CHIPS operated for many years as a net settlement system. Since 2001, it has revised its operational
framework and is now better described as a hybrid system.
7In fact, banks are also able to use foreign RTGS systems connected to TARGET by remote access.
However, this possibility is not widely used, and it is disregarded in the modelling.
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2 The Model
We model a perfectly competitive banking industry over a fixed period of time (say a
month or a quarter) used as the invoice period by the large value interbank payment
system (in short, LVPS). During this period, each bank has potential demands for sending
payments to other banks. All payments are assumed to have the same size.
These payment demands can result from the bank’s own transactions, say on the
interbank market, or else from customer orders.8 Each of these demands is characterized
by a random “value” v˜. This value is interpreted as the monetary surplus that is generated
by routing the payment through the LVPS instead of delaying it and bundling it with
other payments, or instead of finding alternative ways to send payments, for instance by
using a correspondent bank.9
In the first part of this paper, there is a unique LVPS, run by the Central Bank. The
only decision to be made by commercial banks is to select how many payment orders
are routed on the LVPS. Of course, this depends on the structure of the transaction fees
charged by the Central Bank on the LVPS, the focus of this article. The bank decides to
use the LVPS if and only if the value v˜ of the transaction exceeds the marginal fee that is
charged by the Central Bank, denoted p10. Assuming that the time period is large enough
so that the law of large numbers can be applied, the proportion of potential payments
that will be routed on the LVPS by a given bank is equal to:
q = Proba [v˜ ≥ p],
which we will call the “demand function” of the bank and denote by D(p). Its inverse
will be denoted by P (q). The ”utility” function of the bank is then by definition
v(q) =
∫ q
0
P (s)ds.
Suppose that the LVPS charges a non linear tariff T (q) for a transaction volume of q.
The individual surplus for a bank (and its customers) is then equal to v(q)− T (q).11
8As the analysis is concerned with large value transactions, customers would typically be institutional
investors. In fact, interbank transfers represent the bulk of the transactions in LVPSs.
9We neglect the utility that the receiver bank might get from the payment. Modeling this receiver’s
utility would lead to more complex pricing schemes which are outside the scope of this paper.
10If a payment is done on behalf of customers, the assumption of a perfectly competitive market implies
that each customer is charged by its bank at its marginal cost, namely the marginal transaction fee p
charged by the Central Bank.
11In the sequel, we will not analyze the repartition of the surplus between the bank and its customers.
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Banks typically differ in their payment demands. To model this, we assume that the
distributions of monetary surplus across banks are identical up to a translation
v˜ = θ + ε˜,
where θ is an unobservable heterogeneity parameter that characterizes the bank (the
“type” of the bank) and the ε˜s are independently and identically distributed across banks.
For instance, θ could be related to the bank’s size, its efficiency, or to its engagement in
a certain type of financial activity. This linear structure implies a simple parametrization
of banks’ demand and utility functions:
D(θ, p) = Proba [θ + ε˜ ≥ p] = D(0, p− θ),
and
v(θ, q) =
∫ q
0
{θ + D−1(0, s)}ds = θq + v(0, q).
That is, a bank’s utility depends linearly on its type. The advantage of this parametriza-
tion is that it satisfies the familiar “single crossing property” since
∂2v
∂θ∂q
≡ 1 > 0. (1)
This implies that, independently of the pricing structure, the volume of transactions
q(θ) chosen by a bank of type θ will be increasing with θ. Conversely any increasing
function θ → q(θ) can be implemented by an appropriate tariff q → T (q). The additive
parametrization of heterogeneity is only made for convenience: all our results go through
under the more general single crossing property.
As is usual in the nonlinear pricing literature, we assume that the value of θ is privately
observed by each bank, and that the Central Bank only knows the statistical distribution
of θ among banks. The problem of determining the efficient pricing schedule would be
trivial if the individual banks’ payment demand were perfectly observable. In that case,
the best tariff would be first best optimal and would consist of a marginal fee equal to the
marginal cost and a ”personalized” fixed fee that would depend on the surplus obtained
by each bank12. In the more realistic case where tariffs cannot be conditioned on θ, the
second best schedule involves volume based pricing, as we now analyze in detail.
The only assumption that we need is that q is chosen so as to maximize this surplus, which is the case
if banks are perfectly competitive (this is our assumption) but also if banks are mutuals who act in the
best interest of their customers or at the other extreme if banks are monopolistic and extract all the
consumers’ surplus. The case where the banks and the consumers share this surplus in fixed proportions
is also compatible with our analysis.
12In fact there would be an infinity of Pareto optimal tariffs, each associated to a different sharing
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3 Optimal Pricing for a Monopoly LVPS
In this section, we derive the (second best) optimal pricing rule for a public LVPS when
it does not face any competition, either in the same country by a privately run LVPS
(this is studied in Section 4) or in a neighboring country by a publicly run LVPS (this
is studied in Section 5). The pricing rule developed here is a particular case of Ramsey
pricing for a public monopoly subject to a budget constraint (see Bo¨s 1994).
3.1 Discrete distribution of types
To begin with, we adopt a simple discrete distribution of banks’ types. We assume that
there are only two possible types, θL and θH , where θL < θH . A fraction fk of banks is of
type θk, k ∈ {L,H}, and fL + fH = 1.
Denote T (q) the tariff charged by the Central Bank for a volume q of transactions.
Without loss of generality, the tariff T (q) is supposed to be piecewise differentiable, and
whenever it exists, its derivative is denoted by T ′(q). Since banks are not obliged to
participate, we require T (0) = 0 (individual rationality condition). Notice that this is not
incompatible with a fixed fee T which is only incurred for a strictly positive transaction
volume (see also footnote 17).
The indirect “utility” of a bank of type θk is defined as the maximum surplus uk
obtained by a bank of type θk (or its customers) when the tariff charged by the Central
Bank is T . By definition:
uk = max
qk≥0
{v(θk, qk)− T (qk)}, (2)
where the maximum is obtained for a volume qk = q(θk) and a payment Tk = T (qk).Whenever
T is differentiable at q(θ), the first order condition implies:
vq(θ, q(θ)) = T
′(q(θ)), (3)
where vq denotes the partial derivative of v with respect to q. Given that there are only
two types of banks, the Central Bank problem can be reduced to finding two pairs (qk, Tk)
of fixed costs among banks. Not only such a ”discriminatory” tariff would be politically difficult to
implement, but it would require that the Central Bank possess very precise information on characteristics
that individual banks can easily alter.
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that satisfy the agents’ incentive compatibility constraints:
(ICH) : uH = v(θH , qH)− TH ≥ v(θH , qL)− TL (4)
(ICL) : uL = v(θL, qL)− TL ≥ v(θL, qH)− TH (5)
and individual rationality constraints, which guarantee that banks obtain their reservation
utility (which we normalized to 0):
(IRH) : uH ≥ 0 (6)
(IRL) : uL ≥ 0 (7)
Due to the linear parametrization, incentive compatibility conditions can also be writ-
ten as:
(θH − θL)qL ≤ uH − uL ≤ (θH − θL)qH .
The total volume of transactions in the LVPS is Q = fLqL + fHqH . The cost function
of the LVPS is denoted C(Q). We will adopt the following simple specification:
C(Q) = a + cQ, (8)
where a denotes the fixed cost, and the marginal cost13 c is taken to be constant. We
assume that the Central Bank is constrained to choosing a tariff structure that satisfies
budget balance14:
∑
k=L,H
fkT (qk) = C(Q). (9)
The central bank’s problem consists of finding the optimal quantities for both types
of banks qL and qH , together with tariffs TL = T (qL) and TH = T (qH) so that aggregate
surplus S is maximized. S is given by
S =
∑
k=L,H
fkv(θk, qk)− C(Q) =
∑
k=L,H
fks(θk, qk)− a.
where we have defined s(θk, qk) ≡ v(θk, qk)− cqk.
13The marginal cost c incorporates not only the (short term) marginal cost of providing payments
(which is very close to zero for electronic systems) but also the (long term) marginal cost of building
sufficient capacity to avoid bottlenecks and delays.
14Cost recovery is a statutory requirement for many payment systems, for instance TARGET or Fed-
wire.
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The Central Bank therefore needs to maximize
∑
k fk {v(θk, qk)− cqk} under the con-
straints (3) - (7) and (9).
The solution of this problem is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For a monopoly LVPS, the second best optimal tariff satisfies
T ′(qH) = vq(θH , qH) = c
T ′(qL) = vq(θL, qL) = c +
λ
1 + λ
fH
fL
(θH − θL)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the break-even constraint (9).
From Proposition 1, we see that, as soon as the break-even constraint is binding
(λ > 0), the optimal tariff is volume-based: the marginal price T ′ charged to bank
depends on the total number of payments sent by the bank. In particular, banks with
higher volumes face a lower marginal price, i.e. the scheme is degressive. Notice that
high type banks θH , who choose quantity qH , obtain marginal cost pricing, which implies
that their transaction volume is not distorted. However, low type banks θL pay marginal
fees above marginal cost, which implies that they send less payments than what would be
efficient (downward distortion).
When the fixed cost of the system is small, the break-even constraint is not binding
(λ = 0) and the optimal tariff is first-best efficient: marginal fees equal marginal cost
for all types.15 However, in the more realistic case where the fixed cost is high, the need
to achieve budget balance introduces price distortions: marginal fees for low volumes are
set above marginal cost, at the minimum level that deters high type banks to reduce
their transaction volume. Notice that the property that high transaction volumes are
not distorted (“no distortion at the top”), is a standard result in the adverse-selection
literature.
This simple two-type case illustrates the problem of finding the optimal pricing scheme
and thus allows us to find some essential characteristics of the optimal tariff. Still, it is
not sufficient to obtain a complete characterization of the tariff structure, since there
is an infinity of functions T (·) satisfying the conditions of Proposition 1. In particular,
we are not able to determine uniquely the optimal value of the fixed fee. Moreover
it is important to check the robustness of the features of the solution to more general
distributions of unobservable heterogeneity. This is why we now turn to the case of a
continuous distribution of types.
15In this case, fixed fees are needed to cover fixed costs.
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3.2 Continuous distribution of types
We now take the distribution of types to be continuous with density f and c.d.f. F on a
bounded support [θ, θ¯]. The density f is supposed to be log concave. With a continuous
distribution, all aggregate variables need to be redefined. The total volume of transactions
over all banks is now
Q =
∫ θ¯
θ0
q(θ)dF (θ), (10)
where θ0 is the participation
16 threshold, defined implicitly by u(θ0) = 0, and u, the
indirect utility function of the banks is defined as
u(θ) = max
q≥0
{v(θ, q)− T (q)}. (11)
Budget balance of the LVPS is given by∫ θ¯
θ0
T (q(θ))dF (θ) = C(Q), (12)
where Q is given by (10) and q(·) satisfies (3).
Analogously to the two-type case, the optimal pricing for a monopoly LVPS is obtained
by choosing the tariff T (·) and the banks’ reaction function q(·) that maximize aggregate
surplus:
S =
∫ θ¯
θ0
v(θ, q(θ))dF (θ)− C(Q), (13)
under constraints (3), (8), (10) and (12), plus the condition that q(·) is non-decreasing,
which we will only check ex-post. Since this problem is standard, we immediately state
the form of the solution (all proofs are in the appendix).
Proposition 2 When the distribution of types is continuous, the optimal tariff for a
monopoly LVPS is characterized by the absence of a fixed fee17 (T = 0) and a decreas-
ing marginal fee T ′(q). This marginal fee and the transaction volume q(θ) are jointly
16This means that only the banks with type θ above θ0 will send payments in the system.
17The fixed fee (which is here optimally set to zero) is not to be confused with the connection fee
paid by the bank depending on the type of connection it requires (see Hancock et al. (1999) footnote
7). Notice that T (0) = 0 by construction (individual rationality condition) but that T can a priori be
discontinuous at 0 if there is a fixed fee, which we characterize by
T ≡ T (0+) = lim
q→0
q>0
T (q).
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determined by two equations:
T ′(q(θ)) = c +
λ
1 + λ
1− F
f
(θ) = vq(θ, q(θ)), (14)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the break-even constraint (12).
As in the two-type case, we obtain a non-linear, degressive pricing scheme. The
marginal fee is above the marginal cost, except at the top of the distribution of banks
(θ = θ¯) for which T ′(q(θ¯)) = c (no distortion at the top). The increment is proportional
to the inverse hazard rate 1−F
f
which is decreasing in θ since f is log concave.18 Since q(·)
is an increasing function of θ, T ′(q) is decreasing with respect to q. This is illustrated in
Figure 1. T ′ is also increasing with respect to λ, the Lagrange multiplier associated to
the break-even constraint. Extreme values of λ correspond to marginal cost pricing (for
λ = 0) and private monopoly pricing (for λ = +∞). In practice, the optimal T can be
approximated by a menu of two part tariffs.


q
c
T ′(q)
q(θ0) q(θ¯)
Figure 1: Optimal Pricing by a Public Monopoly
Let us now move to the more original problem of optimally pricing a public LVPS that
has a private competitor.
18For a proof see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989).
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4 Optimal pricing in a mixed duopoly
After the monopoly benchmark solution characterized in Section 3, we consider now the
mixed duopoly problem posed by cross border transactions within the EMU, which can
be routed alternatively on TARGET or its private competitor Euro1. Such a mixed
duopoly situation is also present in the US, where the Federal Reserve runs the gross
system FEDWIRE, while large commercial banks run the hybrid system CHIPS. In fact,
this situation exists also, for domestic transactions, in all the countries (including EMU
countries) who have implemented a national RTGS, while allowing commercial banks to
organize simultaneously a competing payment system.19 For the moment we focus on
the mixed duopoly situation, which we illustrate by cross border transactions within the
EMU.
Notice that a unique payment system would probably be more cost-effective (at least in
the short run) due to the property of increasing returns to scale of the payment technology
(see Hancock et al., 1999, for an empirical test of this property). It is also clear that the
coexistence of a private payment system, often organized on a net basis, increases the
potential for systemic risk (see for instance Rochet and Tirole, 1996, and the references
therein for discussions of systemic risk issues in payment systems). However, it would
be politically difficult for any Central Bank to oblige commercial banks to route all their
transactions on a unique system. Moreover, from the point of view of long term efficiency
the co-existence of two systems is probably a good way to provide incentives for cost
minimization and promote innovation (yardstick competition).
We model the private system by considering that the “biggest” or “most efficient”
banks move all their transactions to a different, private LVPS. We believe this assumption
to be consistent with the actual situation, since members of the private systems tend to
represent the largest banks of their respective countries20.
The private LVPS is assumed to be characterized by a cost function
C1(Q1) = a1 + c1Q1
19However, an additional complexity appears in EMU countries, given that the banks that are incor-
porated in several countries can also route their transactions on the national RTGSs of these different
countries: this is analyzed in Section 5.
20Still, in practice even the largest banks use the publicly run RTGS for routing some of their trans-
actions, related for example to money market and foreign exchange operations. For such transactions,
which are often of very large value, immediacy and risk considerations seem to dominate pricing issues.
These issues are left outside the scope of the present paper.
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where c1 < c. This assumption reflects evidence from EU countries suggesting that the
marginal cost for cross-border payment processing is lower in Euro1 than in the public
RTGS systems.
For technical reasons we will restrict ourselves to the case of discrete distributions, and
assume that there are three types of banks, θL < θM < θH , which occur with frequency
fk, k = L,M,H, with fL + fM + fH = 1. Several configurations might occur, whereby
the three types of banks use one system or the other. For the sake of conciseness, we
focus on the most interesting regime where the private system is under the control of the
high type banks only, and the binding participation constraint for the Central Bank is to
prevent medium type banks from also moving their transactions to the private system.21
We assume that the private system is run like a mutual representing the collective
interests of the member banks and their customers, i.e., that they choose a tariff T1 that
maximizes the aggregate surplus generated by the member banks under the break even
constraint
fHTH ≥ C1(Q1).
Since there is only one type using the private system, the tariff structure is simple:
the system needs to recover costs with a payment volume of Q1 = fHqH . This is achieved
with average cost pricing: the fixed fee is shared among participants proportionally, and
marginal fees are equal to the marginal cost. The tariff charged by the private system is
therefore
T1(q) =
a1
fH
+ c1q. (15)
Notice that with this pricing structure, banks choose the transaction volume q that
maximizes surplus
s1H ≡ max
q
[v(θH , q)− c1q] . (16)
We model the public system as a Stackelberg leader: we assume that it has the power
to commit to a tariff T (·) and is able to anticipate the reaction of its private competitor.
21When this constraint is not binding, the solution is the same as in Section 3: the presence of a private
competitor does not affect the pricing policy of the Central Bank. There is also a more complex case
where the Central Bank faces two binding participation constraints: that of low types, and the constraint
that medium types are not attracted by the private system.
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The objective of the public system is thus to maximize aggregate surplus22
max
∑
k=L,M,H
fks(θk, qk(θk)),
under a condition of balanced budget, which requires∑
k=L,M
fkTk ≥ a + c
∑
k=L,M
fkqk.
As before, the Central Bank can design combinations (qk, Tk) for each type of bank
using its system. The incentive constraints of the banks participating in the public system
are, similar to section 3,
(θM − θL) qL ≤ uM − uL ≤ (θM − θL) qM ,
and the participation constraints uL ≥ 0 and uM ≥ 0. Furthermore, one needs to ensure
that banks of type θM have no interest in switching to the private system. This requires
uM ≥ u1M where
u1M ≡ max
q
[v(θM , q)− T (q)] = s1M −
a1
fH
(17)
where s1M , which is defined analogously to (16), denotes the utility that the medium type
bank would have obtained in the private system. This illustrates the difference to the
above monopoly situation analyzed in section 3: now, there is competition ”from above”
since medium type banks can be tempted to join the private system. This requires the
introduction of the additional constraint, uM ≥ u1M . As already discussed, we focus on
the most interesting case in which this is the binding participation constraint. This is the
case if:
s1M −
a1
fH
> (θM − θL) qM . (18)
The optimal pricing is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the highest types θH participate in a private system, the
types θM and θL in the public system, and (18) holds. The optimal marginal tariff in the
public LVPS is then given by
T ′(qM) = vq(θM , qM) = c− λ
1 + λ
fL
fM
(θM − θL)
T ′(qL) = vq(θL, qL) = c.
22Recall that surplus is defined as s(θ, q) = v(θ, q)− cq.
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Therefore, in the case of a mixed duopoly, we again obtain a degressive pricing scheme.
Contrary to the monopoly case however, it is now the lower type who obtains marginal cost
pricing, while the higher type faces a distortion. Moreover, the medium type banks (θM)
face prices that are below marginal cost. This pricing scheme results from competition
with the private system: the private system has marginal fees c1 that are below marginal
cost of the public system, c. In order to give incentives for banks of type θM to use
the public system, there must be a subsidy at the margin. For the low types, marginal
cost pricing is now attainable. This is because of condition (18), which implies that the
medium types do not have any incentives to choose the payment volume of the lower
types, but rather move to the private system. Therefore, there is no need to distort the
lower type’s marginal fee upwards.
The pricing scheme of Proposition 3 necessarily involves a positive fixed fee. Indeed,
since marginal costs are below or equal to the marginal cost c, budget balance can only
be achieved with a fixed fee, high enough to recover not only the fixed cost but also the
subsidies to medium sized banks. This pricing scheme is only viable if v(θL, qL)−T (qL) ≥
0 is still satisfied, i.e. if the lower type’s participation constraint is not violated. In
particular, there is an upper limit to the maximal fixed cost a that can be sustained
with the tariff schedule developed here. For very high a, (or for high λ), the Central
Bank might have to depart from the cost recovery principle or else relax the incentive
constraints by allowing the bank types θM to use the private system. In the more general
case of a continuous distribution of types, the pattern of the optimal tariff is more complex,
involving marginal prices above marginal cost for low volumes, and below marginal cost
for large volumes, combined with a positive fixed fee.
5 Competition Between National RTGSs
We now consider a different type of competition between LVPSs, namely between the
public systems of two different countries (denoted by index i = 1, 2). We model the
banking sectors and the LVPSs of the two countries exactly as before: in both countries,
there is a proportion f ik , i = 1, 2, of banks of type θk, k = L,H. The cost functions of
the LVPS in country i are given by:
Ci = ai + ciQi.
where w.l.o.g., we assume that c1 < c2 and a1 > a2. If all banks were using their own
national LVPS, each country could choose a locally optimal fee structure, as given in
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Proposition 1:
T ′i (q
i
H) = vq(θH , q
i
H) = ci
T ′i (q
i
L) = vq(θL, q
i
L) = ci +
λi
1 + λi
f iH
f iL
(θH − θL) .
Different characteristics of the banking sectors (e.g. a different distribution of bank
types), and differences in the cost structures of the LVPS would lead to different fee
structures across countries. Such an environment may create incentives for banks to by-
pass their own system and route their payments through the system of a neighboring
country instead. In the above example, for instance, for the higher types θH the marginal
fee is lower in country 1 than in country 2. Banks may be in a position to choose which
of the national payment systems to use either because they have subsidiaries in several
countries and therefore access to several national LVPS, or because remote access23 is
possible.
The possibility of by-passing raises many questions for the design of an efficient pricing
scheme, such as whether the different systems should co-ordinate their fee structures, and
whether a uniform fee structure throughout the area could be optimal. This section tries
to address some of these issues.
We will focus on the case where remote access is not possible. Instead, we assume
that only some banks can by-pass because they have branches in the other country. These
are the banks with the higher demand for payments. It is also assumed that some cost
γ needs to be borne by the banks who by-pass. Furthermore, we assume for simplicity
that a bank needs to route all its payments through one single system, i.e. it cannot split
payments so they are routed through two systems at the same time. Finally, we require
that the cost-recovery constraint has to be satisfied for each individual LVPS.
5.1 Efficient pricing with by-passing
Suppose that the cost of bypass is sufficiently low so it is worthwhile for banks of type θH
in country 2 to use the LVPS in country 1. The problem of finding the efficient pricing
structure for that LVPS is derived analogously to the previous sections, the only difference
being that the demand for a high payment volume in country 1 has now increased. The
optimal marginal tariff in country 1 is given in the following proposition:
23Remote access is a possibility in TARGET. However, at present it is not widely used.
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Proposition 4 Suppose that θH-banks from country 2 by-pass. The optimal tariff in
country 1 has to satisfy
T ′1(q
1
H) = T
′
1(q
2
H) = vq(θH , q
1
H) = c1 (a)
T ′1(q
1
L) = vq(θL, q
1
L) = c1 +
λ
1 + λ
f 1H + f
2
H
f 1L
(θH − θL) . (b)
The efficient pricing in country 1 is therefore very similar to the monopoly case: large
banks (type H) face marginal cost pricing (condition a) whether or not they belong to
country 1. Small banks of country 1 pay a higher marginal fee (condition b). In country
2, on the other hand, there is now only one bank type with a positive payment demand.
Therefore, the LVPS can simply apply average cost pricing and charge a tariff
T2(q) =
a1
fL
+ c2q.
Allowing by-pass has one attractive feature: more banks use the system where the
marginal cost of sending payments is lowest (country 1). However, as usual we need to
check whether the participation constraint of the θL- types is satisfied. This might pose
a problem here: because the number of participants in the LVPS of country 2 has now
diminished, the banks with a low payment demand have to bear the entire fixed cost of
running the system, a2, among themselves. Their participation constraint might therefore
be violated, and the system might break down. Thus, there are cases where it can be
justified to deter by-pass. This is what we study now.
5.2 By-passing is deterred
The alternative to allowing by-pass to happen is to change the pricing structure of the
national LVPS in order to make by-pass nonprofitable for banks. One possibility here is
to require a full harmonization of tariffs. In that case, a positive cost of bypass γ would
make by-pass unattractive. However, we have argued above that this solution cannot be
efficient: prices should vary across countries, in order to reflect differences in the structure
of banking sectors and possibly the underlying cost parameters of each LVPS.
A less extreme situation is one in which there are price differences across countries but
they are limited in order to deter by-pass. Since it is the high type banks that are more
likely to by-pass, we just have to introduce the additional constraint that banks of type
θH in country 2 prefer to use their domestic LVPS:
u2H ≥ u1H − γ.
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We focus on the case where this constraint is binding. The analysis depends crucially
on the level of γ, the cost of bypass. We focus on the case that where γ is relatively low
(for details, see the proof in the appendix). Denote by λ1 and λ2 the Lagrange multipliers
of the break even constraints of the two LVPS. For this case, we obtain:
Proposition 5 For a low cost of bypass γ, the optimal pricing scheme that deters by-pass
in country 1 needs to satisfy:
T ′1(q
1
H) = vq(θH , q
1
H) = c1
T ′1(q
1
L) = vq(θL, q
1
L) = c1 +
λ1f
1
H + λ2 (f
2
L + f
2
H)
(1 + λ1)f 1L
(θH − θL),
and in country 2:
T ′2(q
2
H) = vq(θH , q
2
H) = c2 −
λ2
1 + λ2
f 2L
f 2H
(θH − θL)
T ′2(q
2
L) = vq(θL, q
2
L) = c2.
If by-pass is to be deterred, the pricing schemes in the two countries therefore have to
have different features. In the country with the lower marginal cost (i.e. country 1), the
optimal tariff is similar to the one of the monopoly case: it is degressive, and only banks
with a high payment volume pay a marginal fee equal to marginal cost. In the country
facing the risk of by-pass (i.e. country 2), on the other hand, the marginal fee for the
high payment volume needs to be lowered in order to make by-pass unattractive.
Notice, however, that also here we need to verify whether the lower type’s partici-
pation constraints are satisfied: because marginal fees are below marginal cost for some
types, a fixed fee is needed in order to achieve budget balance. If the fixed fee is too high,
or if the marginal subsidy for the high types is too large, then the system is not viable.
Still, because the high type banks in country 2 use their domestic LVPS, budget balance
is easier to satisfy than in the case where by-pass is allowed.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed the optimal pricing in a Large Value Payment System when full cost
recovery is required. We have shown that if the payment system operates as a monopoly,
then the optimal tariff involves quantity discounts, but no fixed fee. This particular
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form of volume-based pricing is the optimal way to achieve recovery of fixed costs, given
the impossibility to implement personalized tariffs. Quantity discounts are important
to ensure that banks with a potentially high payment volume don’t decide to lower the
number of payments sent through the payment system. Moreover, the absence of a fixed
fee ensures participation of low type banks.
The situation changes when the public system faces competition from a private system
which, because of lower marginal costs, is able to attract the banks with the highest
payment demand. The optimal pricing scheme of the public system then needs to be
adjusted. This paper shows that the public system needs to decrease its marginal fees
below marginal costs in order to keep a sufficient volume of transactions; as a result, fixed
fees have to be introduced.
We also analyze the situation where two national public payment systems compete
for the domestic transactions of large banks who have branches in both countries and are
able to route their payments through either system. We characterize the optimal tariffs
and show that they depend on whether such a by-pass is deterred or not. When it is
not, the optimal tariffs exhibit the same qualitative properties as in the monopoly case:
marginal fees are above marginal costs. If on the contrary by-pass is to be deterred, the
features of the optimal tariffs are similar to the case of competition by a private system:
the country that is subject to the risk of by-pass has to decrease its marginal fees below
marginal costs, while the opposite is true for the other country.
One important limitation of our analysis is that we have considered homogenous pay-
ments, so that volume is the variable that can be used to differentiate prices. It would be
important to introduce heterogeneous payments, so as to take into account other char-
acteristics such as size. This would fit more accurately the present situation where large
commercial banks typically use the private system for small to medium size transactions
and the public system for large transactions for which immediate finality is crucial. We
plan to address this extension in a separate paper.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1: We decompose the Central Bank’s problem into two parts:
first, for fixed quantities, it chooses the optimal uk, and in a second step, it chooses the
quantities qk.
It is easy to see that (IRH) is not binding, since (ICH) and (IRL) imply uH ≥ uL.
Furthermore as already noticed, the incentive-compatibility constraints can be simplified
to
(θH − θL)qL ≤ uH − uL ≤ (θH − θL)qH .
The break-even constraint can be re-stated
∑
k fk (sk − uk) ≥ a. From here, it is
immediate that maximizing surplus is equivalent to minimizing the sum of individual
utilities
min
∑
k=L,H
fkuk
such that
(θH − θL)qL ≤ uH − uL ≤ (θH − θL)qH
uL ≥ 0.
It is easy to see that, as usual, the lower type’s participation constraint needs to be
binding, uL = 0, as well as the higher type’s incentive compatibility constraint, uH =
(θH − θL)qL . Using these values of uk, we can in a second step find the quantities qL and
qH that maximize surplus under the break-even constraint, using the Lagrangian:
L =
∑
k=L,H
fksk + λ
{ ∑
k=L,H
fksk − a−
∑
k=L,H
fkuk
}
= (1 + λ)
∑
k=L,H
fk {v(θk, qk)− cqk} − λ {a + fH(θH − θL)qL}
Maximizing w.r.t. qH and qL, we find
vq(θH , qH) = c
and (1 + λ)fLvq(θL, qL) = c + λ(θH − θL), or
vq(θL, qL) = c +
λ
1 + λ
fH
fL
(θH − θL).
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Together with equation (3), this establishes Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2: The indirect “utility” function of the banks is defined in
(11). A simple revealed preference argument, together with the single crossing property
that vθq > 0, implies that q(·) must be everywhere non-decreasing. A classical result
(for a proof, see for instance Fudenberg and Tirole 1993) shows that conversely any non-
decreasing function q(·) can be implemented by a tariff satisfying (3). The envelope
principle applied to condition (11) then implies that for almost every θ:
u′(θ) = vθ(θ, q(θ)).
Adopting the “dual” approach developed by Mirrlees (1971), we use u(·) and q(·) as
policy variables (instead of T ). T will later be derived implicitly by the formula:
T [q(θ)] = v(θ, q(θ))− u(θ). (A.1)
We therefore have to find q(·) and u(·) that solve
max
∫ θ¯
θ0
{v(θ, q(θ))− cq(θ)}dF (θ)
u′(θ) = vθ(θ, q(θ)) θ ∈]θ, θ¯[ (A.2)∫ θ¯
θ
{v(θ, q(θ))− cq(θ)− u(θ)}dF (θ) ≥ a (A.3)
u(θ0) = 0. (A.4)
The solution to the above problem can be obtained by maximizing its Lagrangian:
L =
∫ θ¯
θ0
[(1 + λ){v(θ, q(θ))− cq(θ)} − λu(θ)] f(θ)dθ,
under (A.2) and (A.4). The term in u can be eliminated by an integration by parts:∫ θ¯
θ0
u(θ)f(θ)dθ =
∫ θ¯
θ0
q(θ)(1− F (θ))dθ
which gives
L =
∫ θ¯
θ0
[(1 + λ){v(θ, q(θ))− cq(θ)}f(θ)− λq(θ)(1− F (θ))] dθ.
This is maximized when
vq(θ, q(θ)) = c +
λ
1 + λ
1− F
f
(θ). (A.5)
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The optimal marginal fee T ′(q) is thus determined jointly with the optimal volume
q(θ) by (A.5) and the condition
T ′(q(θ)) = vq(θ, q(θ)). (A.6)
Since 1−F
f
decreases in θ (since f is log-concave), total differentiation of (A.5) gives
vθq + vqqq
′(θ) < 0.
This implies q′(θ) > 0 (as was to be checked), since vθq > 0 and vqq < 0. Similarly, by
differentiating (A.6) we see that T ′ is decreasing.
The participation threshold is determined by maximizing L with respect to θ0. We
obtain:
(1 + λ){v(θ0, q(θ0))− cq(θ0)}f(θ0) = λq(θ0)(1− F (θ0)).
Thus
v(θ0, q(θ0))
q(θ0)
= c +
λ
1 + λ
1− F (θ0)
f(θ0)
= vq(θ0, q(θ0)).
Given the strict concavity of v in q (and the fact that v(θ0, 0) = 0) this is only possible
when q(θ0) = 0. This implies in turn that the optimal fixed fee is zero, since it is defined
as
T = lim
q→0+
T (q) = lim
θ→θ0
T (q(θ)).
But T (q(θ)) = v(θ, q(θ))− u(θ) and both terms tend to zero when θ → θ0.
Proof of Proposition 3: As before, we divide the problem into two steps, and as a first
step, find the optimal uL and uM for given quantities qL and qM . Again, maximization of
surplus requires minimization of
∑
k fkuk under the constraints
uL ≥ 0
uM ≥ s1M −
a1
fH
(θM − θL) qL ≤ uM − uL ≤ (θM − θL) qM .
where type θ’s lower participation constraint (uM ≥ 0) is left out as it is not binding.
Under assumption (18), it is easy to see that the minimal uk satisfy:
uM = s
1
M −
a1
fM
uL = uM − (θM − θL) qM .
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Assumption (18) implies that, in order to induce the middle types not to change to
the private system, uM needs to be so high that uL = 0 is no longer attainable. Indeed,
this would violate the lower types incentive constraint not to mimic middle types.
Given the optimal values of uL and uM , the second step of the maximization problem
is to find the optimal quantities qL and qM . The budget balance constraint of the public
system can be rewritten as:
fLsL + fMsM ≥ a + fLuL + fMuM .
Denoting by λ the multiplier associated with this budget constraint, the Lagrangian
of the problem writes:
L =
∑
k=L,M
fksk + λ
{ ∑
k=L,M
fksk − a− fLuL − fMuM
}
= (1 + λ)
∑
fksk − λ
[
a + (fL + fH)(s
1
M −
a1
fM
)− fL(θM − θL)qM
]
Here, we have left out the surplus of the θH-types, as it is constant from the point of
view of the public system. Maximization with respect to qL and qM yields
vq(θL, qL) = c (A.7)
vq(θM , qM) = c− λ
1 + λ
fL
fH
(θM − θL). (A.8)
Together with the bank’s optimality condition T ′(qk) = vq(θk, qk), this establishes Propo-
sition 3.24
Proof of Proposition 5: As before, the first step of the maximization problem consists in
minimizing expected rents subject to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality
constraints, i.e.
min
∑
i,k
f iku
i
k
such that
uiL ≥ 0 (αi1)
uiH − uiL ≤ (θH − θL)qiH (αi2)
(θH − θL)qiL ≤ uiH − uiL (αi3)
u1H − γ ≤ u2H (α4)
24The value of the Lagrange multiplier λ can be determined together with qM by using (A.8) and the
budget constraint. Here, it is useful to work with the ”virtual type” θˆM ≡ θM + λ1+λ fLfM (θM − θL).
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are satisfied for i = 1, 2. Let αij denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
constraints. We focus on the case where the last constraint is binding, so that u2H = u
1
H−γ.
Furthermore, there are two possibilities, depending on whether or not
u1H − γ ≥ (θH − θL)q2H (A.9)
is satisfied. Suppose that (A.9) holds. The minimal values for uik, i = 1, 2, k = L,H, that
satisfy all seven constraints are then
u1L = 0 u
2
L = (θH − θL) (q1L − q2H)− γ
u1H = (θH − θL)q1L u2H = (θH − θL)q1L − γ.
As before, these values are used in the second step for finding the optimal quantities
qik. The Lagrangian of the problem is
£ =
∑
i=1,2
∑
k=L,H
f iks
i
k +
∑
i=1,2
λi
{ ∑
k=L,H
f iks
i
k −
∑
k=L,H
f iku
i
k
}
=
∑
i=1,2
(1 + λi)
∑
k=L,H
f iks
i
k − λ1f 1H(θH − θL)q1L − λ2
(
f 2L + f
2
H
) [
(θH − θL)q1L − γ
]
+ λ2q
2
H .
The first order conditions yield
vq(θL, q
1
L) = c1 +
λ1f
1
H + λ2 (f
2
L + f
2
H)
(1 + λ1)f 1L
(θH − θL)
vq(θH , q
1
H) = c1
vq(θL, q
2
L) = c2
vq(θH , q
2
H) = c2 −
λ2
1 + λ2
f 2L
f 2H
(θH − θL).
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